LEADER 03899cam a22005178i 4500
001 796930
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260123011447
006 m d | |
007 cr |||||||||||
008 201215s2021 nyu ob 001 0 eng
020 |a9781003095576|q(ebook)
020 |a1003095577
020 |a9781000382358|q(electronic bk.)
020 |a1000382354|q(electronic bk.)
020 |a9781000382365|q(electronic bk. : EPUB)
020 |a1000382362|q(electronic bk. : EPUB)
020 |z9780367558840|q(hardback)
035 |a(OCoLC)1227821431
035 |a(OCoLC-P)1227821431
040 |aOCoLC-P|beng|erda|cOCoLC-P
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 00|aDS79.76
072 7|aHIS|x037030|2bisacsh
072 7|aHIS|x036060|2bisacsh
072 7|aHBJK|2bicssc
082 00|a956.7044/38|223
100 1 |aHartenian, Lawrence Raymond,|eauthor.
245 10|aGeorge W Bush administration propaganda for an invasion of Iraq :|bthe absence of evidence /|cLarry Hartenian.
264 1|aNew York, NY :|bRoutledge,|c2021.
300 |a1 online resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bn|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bnc|2rdacarrier
490 0 |aRoutledge advances in American history
505 0 |aThe propaganda build up on Iraq in the first year and one half of the Bush administration -- Bush administration views on Iraq in 2001 -- Bush administration propaganda on Iraq, January through August 2002 -- Intelligence and information manipulation to make the propaganda case -- Bush administration vigorous propaganda for an invasion of Iraq -- The propaganda push for invasion -- Making the case -- Administration intelligence : Iraqi support for terrorism and the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate -- Pressure and politicization -- Shock and awe -- Final months, final matters -- Bush administration propaganda techniques -- Evidence and truth in Bush administration propaganda.
520 |a"Hartenian's history of George W Bush propaganda for an invasion of Iraq returns the administration's approach to its conceptual origins. Hartenian places "evidence" in the center of his analysis, showing that Rumsfeld's "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" meant that no evidence was necessary to justify an invasion. 9/11, indeed, "changed everything" for the Bush administration and in its aftermath the time for regime change in Iraq had simply come. With no good evidence to support its fears, the administration was certain of post-9/11 conceived Iraq-al-Qaeda "nexus," just as with no evidence except the "absence of evidence" it was certain of Iraqi mastery of "denial and deception" that hid "Saddam's" "evil" activities. Resting on Cheney's "one percent doctrine," administration "certainty" of the threat from Iraq required a US invasion. The policy offices of Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, with the help of George Tenet at CIA, would generate a case of such fright and enormity-the "mushroom cloud"-that required administration action. Manipulating intelligence and ignoring the growing body of evidence undermining its case, the Bush administration invaded Iraq to bring about "regime change.""--|cProvided by publisher.
588 |aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
600 10|aBush, George W.|q(George Walker),|d1946-|xPolitical and social views.
647 7|aIraq War|d(2003-2011)|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01802311
650 0|aIraq War, 2003-2011|xCauses.
650 0|aIraq War, 2003-2011|xPropaganda.
650 7|aHISTORY / Modern / General|2bisacsh
650 7|aHISTORY / United States / 20th Century|2bisacsh
651 0|aUnited States|xPolitics and government|y2001-2009.
856 40|3Taylor & Francis|uhttps://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003095576
856 42|3OCLC metadata license agreement|uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
901 |aTaylor & Francis