Ideology and the Evolution of Vital Institutions [electronic resource] : Guilds, The Gold Standard, and Modern International Cooperation / by Earl A. Thompson, Charles R. Hickson.
Erişim Adresi
ISBN
9781461514572
Dil Kodu
İngilizce
Yer Numarası
DK/6798
Yazar
Basım Bildirimi
2nd ed. 2001.
Yayın Bilgisi
New York, NY : Springer US : Imprint: Springer, 2001.
Fiziksel Niteleme
XIX, 406 p. online resource.
İçindekiler Notu
1 Overview -- I An Example: Significant Bilateral Exchange -- II Generalizing the Example: A Theory of Social Organization -- III How Optimality Criteria Depend upon the Political Environment -- IV Rationalizing Citizen-Efficiency and Distributional Advice -- V The Need for a Rapid Adjustment Process -- VI Achieving Rapid Adjustment: Vitalness and Effective Democracy -- VII The Economic Benefits of Effective Democracy: Efficiency Tests -- VIII The Impermanence of Dominance -- IX A Brief Readers’ Guide for Specialists -- X The Evolutionary Argument: A More Detailed Readers’ Guide -- XI Extension to Biology: An Evolutionary Principle -- XII A Summary of the Policy Framework -- 2 The Efficiency Problem, the Distribution Problem, and a Possible Solution -- I The Efficiency Problem -- II The Distributional Problem -- III A Constitutional Solution -- 3 A New Interpretation of Guilds, Tariffs, and Laissez Faire -- Abstract and Introduction -- I An Efficiency-Based Theory of Democratic Political Associations -- II Efficient Guild Policies -- III The Economic Policies Generated by Protectionist Lobbies -- IV Policy Conclusion: On the Beating of Live Horses -- 4 On the Gold Standard: Why Depressions have been a Necessary Evil, or How the Economics of Keynes Dethroned Europe -- Introduction: Emergency Finance and the Gold Standard -- I Mainstream Macroeconomics and the Gold Standard -- II Business Cycles and the Gold Standard -- III The Broad Price Trends Observed under the Gold Standard -- IV Emergency Finance after the Gold Standard -- 5 On Modern International Cooperation: Exchange Controls, Hyperinflation, and Costly Social Revolution as Efficient National Responses to Externally Imposed Trade Liberalization -- Abstract and Introduction -- I The Primary Western Policy Imposition and the Responses of theDependent Nations -- II Peacetime Hyperinflation as a Rational Response to Dominant-Country Reactions to Permissible Exchange Controls -- III A Model of Rational Hyperinflation -- IV Statistical Analysis -- V Graphical Summary -- VI Conclusions -- 6 Summary, Policy Implications, and a Final Test -- I Vital Institutions and Civilizational Upturns -- II Civilizational Downturns and How to Avoid Them -- III Avoiding the Pending Distributional Disaster -- IV Does Economics Have Another Lesson for Biology? -- V Life in the Fast Lane -- VI An Intellectual Effect of the Proposed Policy -- References for the Text and A-Appendices.
Özet, vb.
In this book, Thompson and Hickson strongly challenge the standard interpretation of the basis of growth and viability of dominant wealthy nations. Briefly, efforts of the economically wealthy and the government leaders to increase their wealth and protect it from aggressors, internal and external, are cast in a new evolutionary light. The challenge is to the idea that societies leading intellectual formulators of political and social policy have been helpful. Their alternative, and persuasive, interpretation is that the rise and survival of wealthier nations has been achieved because of an `effective democracy'. The authors explain why an effective democratic state must avoid `narrow, short-sighted', rational appearing concessions to a sequence of aggressors. In short, the Thompson-Hickson interpretation of the rise of wealthy dominant nations does not rely on advice of superior intellectual advisors, but instead rests on the pragmatic, almost ad hoc, actions of democratic legislators.
Konu
International relations.
Econometrics.
International economic relations.
Economics __ History.
Political science.
International Relations.
Quantitative Economics.
International Economics.
History of Economic Thought and Methodology.
Political Science.
Econometrics.
International economic relations.
Economics __ History.
Political science.
International Relations.
Quantitative Economics.
International Economics.
History of Economic Thought and Methodology.
Political Science.
Diğer Yazarlar
Kurum Adı
Eseri Alıntıla
Referansları kullanmadan önce gözden geçirmeniz ve varsa gerekli düzeltmeleri yapmanız önerilir.
Dijital Kaynak
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245 10|aIdeology and the Evolution of Vital Institutions|h[electronic resource] :|bGuilds, The Gold Standard, and Modern International Cooperation /|cby Earl A. Thompson, Charles R. Hickson.
250 |a2nd ed. 2001.
264 1|aNew York, NY :|bSpringer US :|bImprint: Springer,|c2001.
300 |aXIX, 406 p.|bonline resource.
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337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
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505 0 |a1 Overview -- I An Example: Significant Bilateral Exchange -- II Generalizing the Example: A Theory of Social Organization -- III How Optimality Criteria Depend upon the Political Environment -- IV Rationalizing Citizen-Efficiency and Distributional Advice -- V The Need for a Rapid Adjustment Process -- VI Achieving Rapid Adjustment: Vitalness and Effective Democracy -- VII The Economic Benefits of Effective Democracy: Efficiency Tests -- VIII The Impermanence of Dominance -- IX A Brief Readers’ Guide for Specialists -- X The Evolutionary Argument: A More Detailed Readers’ Guide -- XI Extension to Biology: An Evolutionary Principle -- XII A Summary of the Policy Framework -- 2 The Efficiency Problem, the Distribution Problem, and a Possible Solution -- I The Efficiency Problem -- II The Distributional Problem -- III A Constitutional Solution -- 3 A New Interpretation of Guilds, Tariffs, and Laissez Faire -- Abstract and Introduction -- I An Efficiency-Based Theory of Democratic Political Associations -- II Efficient Guild Policies -- III The Economic Policies Generated by Protectionist Lobbies -- IV Policy Conclusion: On the Beating of Live Horses -- 4 On the Gold Standard: Why Depressions have been a Necessary Evil, or How the Economics of Keynes Dethroned Europe -- Introduction: Emergency Finance and the Gold Standard -- I Mainstream Macroeconomics and the Gold Standard -- II Business Cycles and the Gold Standard -- III The Broad Price Trends Observed under the Gold Standard -- IV Emergency Finance after the Gold Standard -- 5 On Modern International Cooperation: Exchange Controls, Hyperinflation, and Costly Social Revolution as Efficient National Responses to Externally Imposed Trade Liberalization -- Abstract and Introduction -- I The Primary Western Policy Imposition and the Responses of theDependent Nations -- II Peacetime Hyperinflation as a Rational Response to Dominant-Country Reactions to Permissible Exchange Controls -- III A Model of Rational Hyperinflation -- IV Statistical Analysis -- V Graphical Summary -- VI Conclusions -- 6 Summary, Policy Implications, and a Final Test -- I Vital Institutions and Civilizational Upturns -- II Civilizational Downturns and How to Avoid Them -- III Avoiding the Pending Distributional Disaster -- IV Does Economics Have Another Lesson for Biology? -- V Life in the Fast Lane -- VI An Intellectual Effect of the Proposed Policy -- References for the Text and A-Appendices.
520 |aIn this book, Thompson and Hickson strongly challenge the standard interpretation of the basis of growth and viability of dominant wealthy nations. Briefly, efforts of the economically wealthy and the government leaders to increase their wealth and protect it from aggressors, internal and external, are cast in a new evolutionary light. The challenge is to the idea that societies leading intellectual formulators of political and social policy have been helpful. Their alternative, and persuasive, interpretation is that the rise and survival of wealthier nations has been achieved because of an `effective democracy'. The authors explain why an effective democratic state must avoid `narrow, short-sighted', rational appearing concessions to a sequence of aggressors. In short, the Thompson-Hickson interpretation of the rise of wealthy dominant nations does not rely on advice of superior intellectual advisors, but instead rests on the pragmatic, almost ad hoc, actions of democratic legislators.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aInternational relations.
650 0|aEconometrics.
650 0|aInternational economic relations.
650 0|aEconomics|xHistory.
650 0|aPolitical science.
650 14|aInternational Relations.
650 24|aQuantitative Economics.
650 24|aInternational Economics.
650 24|aHistory of Economic Thought and Methodology.
650 24|aPolitical Science.
700 1 |aHickson, Charles R.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9780792373902
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461514589
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461355632
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1457-2
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPI
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPolitical Science and International Studies (R0) (SpringerNature-43724)
001 805478
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260127000222
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 121227s2001 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9781461514572|9978-1-4615-1457-2
024 7 |a10.1007/978-1-4615-1457-2|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aJZ2-6530
072 7|aJPS|2bicssc
072 7|aPOL011000|2bisacsh
072 7|aJPS|2thema
082 04|a327|223
090 |aDK/6798
100 1 |aThompson, Earl A.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aIdeology and the Evolution of Vital Institutions|h[electronic resource] :|bGuilds, The Gold Standard, and Modern International Cooperation /|cby Earl A. Thompson, Charles R. Hickson.
250 |a2nd ed. 2001.
264 1|aNew York, NY :|bSpringer US :|bImprint: Springer,|c2001.
300 |aXIX, 406 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |a1 Overview -- I An Example: Significant Bilateral Exchange -- II Generalizing the Example: A Theory of Social Organization -- III How Optimality Criteria Depend upon the Political Environment -- IV Rationalizing Citizen-Efficiency and Distributional Advice -- V The Need for a Rapid Adjustment Process -- VI Achieving Rapid Adjustment: Vitalness and Effective Democracy -- VII The Economic Benefits of Effective Democracy: Efficiency Tests -- VIII The Impermanence of Dominance -- IX A Brief Readers’ Guide for Specialists -- X The Evolutionary Argument: A More Detailed Readers’ Guide -- XI Extension to Biology: An Evolutionary Principle -- XII A Summary of the Policy Framework -- 2 The Efficiency Problem, the Distribution Problem, and a Possible Solution -- I The Efficiency Problem -- II The Distributional Problem -- III A Constitutional Solution -- 3 A New Interpretation of Guilds, Tariffs, and Laissez Faire -- Abstract and Introduction -- I An Efficiency-Based Theory of Democratic Political Associations -- II Efficient Guild Policies -- III The Economic Policies Generated by Protectionist Lobbies -- IV Policy Conclusion: On the Beating of Live Horses -- 4 On the Gold Standard: Why Depressions have been a Necessary Evil, or How the Economics of Keynes Dethroned Europe -- Introduction: Emergency Finance and the Gold Standard -- I Mainstream Macroeconomics and the Gold Standard -- II Business Cycles and the Gold Standard -- III The Broad Price Trends Observed under the Gold Standard -- IV Emergency Finance after the Gold Standard -- 5 On Modern International Cooperation: Exchange Controls, Hyperinflation, and Costly Social Revolution as Efficient National Responses to Externally Imposed Trade Liberalization -- Abstract and Introduction -- I The Primary Western Policy Imposition and the Responses of theDependent Nations -- II Peacetime Hyperinflation as a Rational Response to Dominant-Country Reactions to Permissible Exchange Controls -- III A Model of Rational Hyperinflation -- IV Statistical Analysis -- V Graphical Summary -- VI Conclusions -- 6 Summary, Policy Implications, and a Final Test -- I Vital Institutions and Civilizational Upturns -- II Civilizational Downturns and How to Avoid Them -- III Avoiding the Pending Distributional Disaster -- IV Does Economics Have Another Lesson for Biology? -- V Life in the Fast Lane -- VI An Intellectual Effect of the Proposed Policy -- References for the Text and A-Appendices.
520 |aIn this book, Thompson and Hickson strongly challenge the standard interpretation of the basis of growth and viability of dominant wealthy nations. Briefly, efforts of the economically wealthy and the government leaders to increase their wealth and protect it from aggressors, internal and external, are cast in a new evolutionary light. The challenge is to the idea that societies leading intellectual formulators of political and social policy have been helpful. Their alternative, and persuasive, interpretation is that the rise and survival of wealthier nations has been achieved because of an `effective democracy'. The authors explain why an effective democratic state must avoid `narrow, short-sighted', rational appearing concessions to a sequence of aggressors. In short, the Thompson-Hickson interpretation of the rise of wealthy dominant nations does not rely on advice of superior intellectual advisors, but instead rests on the pragmatic, almost ad hoc, actions of democratic legislators.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aInternational relations.
650 0|aEconometrics.
650 0|aInternational economic relations.
650 0|aEconomics|xHistory.
650 0|aPolitical science.
650 14|aInternational Relations.
650 24|aQuantitative Economics.
650 24|aInternational Economics.
650 24|aHistory of Economic Thought and Methodology.
650 24|aPolitical Science.
700 1 |aHickson, Charles R.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9780792373902
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461514589
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461355632
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1457-2
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPI
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPolitical Science and International Studies (R0) (SpringerNature-43724)
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