Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison: [electronic resource] : Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities? / edited by Léna Soler, H. Sankey, Paul Hoyningen-Huene.
Erişim Adresi
ISBN
9781402062797
Dil Kodu
İngilizce
Yer Numarası
DK/7627
Basım Bildirimi
1st ed. 2008.
Yayın Bilgisi
Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 2008.
Fiziksel Niteleme
X, 395 p. online resource.
Dizi
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2214-7942 ; 255
İçindekiler Notu
Incommensurability, As Differences in Quasi-Intuitive Cognitive Capacities: A Task for Psychology? -- Incommensurability Naturalized -- Commentary on Bird’s Paper -- Incommensurability in a Wittgensteinian Perspective: How to Make Sense of Nonsense -- Nonsense and Paradigm Change -- Commentary on “Nonsense and Paradigm Change”, by Aristides Baltas -- Intra-Theoretical Change, as a Subjective Creative Elucidation of an Objective Formerly Present Content -- From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change -- Commentary on “From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change”, by Anouk Barberousse -- Investigating the Continuities of Scientific Theorizing: A Task for the Bayesian? -- Modeling High-Temperature Superconductivity: Correspondence at Bay? -- An Instrumental Bayesianism Meets the History of Science -- From the Cumulativity of Physical Predictions to the Cumulativity of Physics -- Is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint -- Commentary on “is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint”, by Bernard d’Espagnat -- From Denotational Continuity to Entity Realism -- The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: the Case of the Electron -- Some Optimism for the Pessimist -- Is a Realist Interpretation of Quantum Physics Possible? -- Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality? -- Commentary on “Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality?”, by Herve Zwirn -- Ontological Continuity: A Policy for Model Building or an Argument in Favour of Scientific Realism? -- Reasons for Choosing Among Readings of Equipollent Theories -- Harré Needs No Realism -- A Change of Perspective: Dissolving the Incommensurability Problem in the Framework of a Theoretical Pluralism Incorporating an Instrumental Rationality -- Of Course Idealizations Are Incommensurable! -- Incommensurability from a Modelling Perspective -- What Can Philosophical Theories of Scientific Method Do? -- The Aim And Structure Of Methodological Theory -- Method and Objectivity.-A New Kind of Incommensurability at the Level of Experimental Practices? -- The Incommensurability of Experimental Practices: An Incommensurability of What? An Incommensurability of A Third Type? -- Some Reflections on Experimental Incommensurability -- Pragmatic Breakdowns: A New Kind of Scientific Revolution? -- Disruptive Scientific Change -- Scientific Revolutions: the View from Inside and the View from Outside.
Özet, vb.
The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exists between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. And it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of "new experimentalists". The book is constituted of fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. Each paper is followed by a critical commentary. The conference was a striking example of the sort of genuine dialogue that can take place between philosophersof science, historians of science and scientists who come from different traditions and endorse opposing commitments. This is one of the attractions of the volume.
Konu
Social sciences.
Humanities.
Science __ Philosophy.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Humanities and Social Sciences.
Philosophy of Science.
Epistemology.
Humanities.
Science __ Philosophy.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Humanities and Social Sciences.
Philosophy of Science.
Epistemology.
Diğer Yazarlar
Kurum Adı
Eseri Alıntıla
Referansları kullanmadan önce gözden geçirmeniz ve varsa gerekli düzeltmeleri yapmanız önerilir.
Dijital Kaynak
MARC Görünümü
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490 1 |aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v255
505 0 |aIncommensurability, As Differences in Quasi-Intuitive Cognitive Capacities: A Task for Psychology? -- Incommensurability Naturalized -- Commentary on Bird’s Paper -- Incommensurability in a Wittgensteinian Perspective: How to Make Sense of Nonsense -- Nonsense and Paradigm Change -- Commentary on “Nonsense and Paradigm Change”, by Aristides Baltas -- Intra-Theoretical Change, as a Subjective Creative Elucidation of an Objective Formerly Present Content -- From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change -- Commentary on “From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change”, by Anouk Barberousse -- Investigating the Continuities of Scientific Theorizing: A Task for the Bayesian? -- Modeling High-Temperature Superconductivity: Correspondence at Bay? -- An Instrumental Bayesianism Meets the History of Science -- From the Cumulativity of Physical Predictions to the Cumulativity of Physics -- Is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint -- Commentary on “is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint”, by Bernard d’Espagnat -- From Denotational Continuity to Entity Realism -- The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: the Case of the Electron -- Some Optimism for the Pessimist -- Is a Realist Interpretation of Quantum Physics Possible? -- Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality? -- Commentary on “Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality?”, by Herve Zwirn -- Ontological Continuity: A Policy for Model Building or an Argument in Favour of Scientific Realism? -- Reasons for Choosing Among Readings of Equipollent Theories -- Harré Needs No Realism -- A Change of Perspective: Dissolving the Incommensurability Problem in the Framework of a Theoretical Pluralism Incorporating an Instrumental Rationality -- Of Course Idealizations Are Incommensurable! -- Incommensurability from a Modelling Perspective -- What Can Philosophical Theories of Scientific Method Do? -- The Aim And Structure Of Methodological Theory -- Method and Objectivity.-A New Kind of Incommensurability at the Level of Experimental Practices? -- The Incommensurability of Experimental Practices: An Incommensurability of What? An Incommensurability of A Third Type? -- Some Reflections on Experimental Incommensurability -- Pragmatic Breakdowns: A New Kind of Scientific Revolution? -- Disruptive Scientific Change -- Scientific Revolutions: the View from Inside and the View from Outside.
520 |aThe volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exists between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. And it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of "new experimentalists". The book is constituted of fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. Each paper is followed by a critical commentary. The conference was a striking example of the sort of genuine dialogue that can take place between philosophersof science, historians of science and scientists who come from different traditions and endorse opposing commitments. This is one of the attractions of the volume.
650 0|aSocial sciences.
650 0|aHumanities.
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 14|aHumanities and Social Sciences.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Science.
650 24|aEpistemology.
700 1 |aSoler, Léna.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aSankey, H.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aHoyningen-Huene, Paul.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
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776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048116904
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789400786875
830 0|aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v255
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXH
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950 |aHistory (R0) (SpringerNature-43722)
001 806322
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260127001853
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2008 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9781402062797|9978-1-4020-6279-7
024 7 |a10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aH1-99
050 4|aAZ19.2-999
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072 7|aNON000000|2bisacsh
072 7|aGT|2thema
082 04|a300|223
082 04|a001.3|223
090 |aDK/7627
245 10|aRethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison:|h[electronic resource] :|bStabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities? /|cedited by Léna Soler, H. Sankey, Paul Hoyningen-Huene.
250 |a1st ed. 2008.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c2008.
300 |aX, 395 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v255
505 0 |aIncommensurability, As Differences in Quasi-Intuitive Cognitive Capacities: A Task for Psychology? -- Incommensurability Naturalized -- Commentary on Bird’s Paper -- Incommensurability in a Wittgensteinian Perspective: How to Make Sense of Nonsense -- Nonsense and Paradigm Change -- Commentary on “Nonsense and Paradigm Change”, by Aristides Baltas -- Intra-Theoretical Change, as a Subjective Creative Elucidation of an Objective Formerly Present Content -- From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change -- Commentary on “From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change”, by Anouk Barberousse -- Investigating the Continuities of Scientific Theorizing: A Task for the Bayesian? -- Modeling High-Temperature Superconductivity: Correspondence at Bay? -- An Instrumental Bayesianism Meets the History of Science -- From the Cumulativity of Physical Predictions to the Cumulativity of Physics -- Is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint -- Commentary on “is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint”, by Bernard d’Espagnat -- From Denotational Continuity to Entity Realism -- The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: the Case of the Electron -- Some Optimism for the Pessimist -- Is a Realist Interpretation of Quantum Physics Possible? -- Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality? -- Commentary on “Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality?”, by Herve Zwirn -- Ontological Continuity: A Policy for Model Building or an Argument in Favour of Scientific Realism? -- Reasons for Choosing Among Readings of Equipollent Theories -- Harré Needs No Realism -- A Change of Perspective: Dissolving the Incommensurability Problem in the Framework of a Theoretical Pluralism Incorporating an Instrumental Rationality -- Of Course Idealizations Are Incommensurable! -- Incommensurability from a Modelling Perspective -- What Can Philosophical Theories of Scientific Method Do? -- The Aim And Structure Of Methodological Theory -- Method and Objectivity.-A New Kind of Incommensurability at the Level of Experimental Practices? -- The Incommensurability of Experimental Practices: An Incommensurability of What? An Incommensurability of A Third Type? -- Some Reflections on Experimental Incommensurability -- Pragmatic Breakdowns: A New Kind of Scientific Revolution? -- Disruptive Scientific Change -- Scientific Revolutions: the View from Inside and the View from Outside.
520 |aThe volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exists between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. And it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of "new experimentalists". The book is constituted of fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. Each paper is followed by a critical commentary. The conference was a striking example of the sort of genuine dialogue that can take place between philosophersof science, historians of science and scientists who come from different traditions and endorse opposing commitments. This is one of the attractions of the volume.
650 0|aSocial sciences.
650 0|aHumanities.
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 14|aHumanities and Social Sciences.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Science.
650 24|aEpistemology.
700 1 |aSoler, Léna.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aSankey, H.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aHoyningen-Huene, Paul.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781402062742
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048116904
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789400786875
830 0|aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v255
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXH
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aHistory (R0) (SpringerNature-43722)
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