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008 130916s1996 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9781402041099|9978-1-4020-4109-9
024 7 |a10.1007/978-1-4020-4109-9|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aB800.2-804
072 7|aHPCD|2bicssc
072 7|aPHI016000|2bisacsh
072 7|aQDH|2thema
082 04|a190.903|223
090 |aDK/7923
100 1 |aHintikka, Jaakko.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aLudwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths|h[electronic resource] /|cby Jaakko Hintikka.
250 |a1st ed. 1996.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1996.
300 |aXIV, 354 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
520 |aIF WITI'GENSTEIN COULD TALK, COULD WE UNDERSTAND HIM? Perusing the secondary literature on Wittgenstein, I have frequently experienced a perfect Brechtean Entfremdungseffekt. This is interesting, I have felt like saying when reading books and papers on Wittgenstein, but who is the writer talking about? Certainly not Ludwig Wittgenstein the actual person who wrote his books and notebooks and whom I happened to meet. Why is there this strange gap between the ideas of the actual philosopher and the musings of his interpreters? Wittgenstein is talking to us through the posthumous publication of his writings. Why don't philosophers understand what he is saying? A partial reason is outlined in the first essay of this volume. Wittgenstein was far too impatient to explain in his books and book drafts what his problems were, what it was that he was trying to get clear about. He was even too impatient to explain in full his earlier solutions, often merely referring to them casually as it were ina shorthand notation. For one important instance, in The Brown Book, Wittgenstein had explained in some detail what name-object relationships amount to in his view. There he offers both an explanation of what his problem is and an account of his own view illustrated by means of specific examples of language-games. But when he raises the same question again in Philosophical Investigations I, sec.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aPhilosophy, Modern.
650 0|aLanguage and languages|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0|aPhenomenology .
650 14|aEarly Modern Philosophy.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Language.
650 24|aEpistemology.
650 24|aPhenomenology.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9780792340911
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9780792342809
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401721219
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4109-9
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)