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020 |a9783319065878|9978-3-319-06587-8
024 7 |a10.1007/978-3-319-06587-8|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
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100 1 |aAgassi, Joseph.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aPopper and His Popular Critics|h[electronic resource] :|bThomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos /|cby Joseph Agassi.
250 |a1st ed. 2014.
264 1|aCham :|bSpringer International Publishing :|bImprint: Springer,|c2014.
300 |aXX, 158 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aSpringerBriefs in Philosophy,|x2211-4556
505 0 |aIntroduction -- Preface -- Acknowledgement -- A. Prelims -- A1. On Human Rules about God’s World A2. In search for Rules -- A3. Rules against Mock-Criticism -- A4. Rules against excessive defensiveness -- A5. Against the Bouncers in the Gates of Science.-  A5. Duhem, Quine and Kuhn -- B. Popper and his Popular Critics.-  B1. Karl Raimund Popper B2. Kuhn’s Way -- B3. Feyerabend’s Proposal B4. Imre Lakatos -- B5. A Touch of Malice -- C. In a Nutshell -- C1. The Essential Popper -- C2. Kuhn on Pluralism and Incommensurability -- C3. Paul Feyerabend and Rational Pluralism -- C4. Lakatos on the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs --  C5. Epilogue: Civilization and its Self-Defense -- D. References -- D1. Appendix 1: The Biological Base of Dogmatism.- D2. Appendix 2: Popper on Explanation -- D3. Bibliography -- D4. Index of names -- D5. Index of Subjects.  .
520 |aThis volume examines Popper’s philosophy by analyzing the criticism of his most popular critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos. They all followed his rejection of the traditional view of science as inductive. Starting from the assumption that Hume’s criticism of induction is valid, the book explores the central criticism and objections that these three critics have raised. Their objections have met with great success, are significant and deserve paraphrase. One also may consider them reasonable protests against Popper’s high standards rather than fundamental criticisms of his philosophy. The book starts out with a preliminary discussion of some central background material and essentials of Popper’s philosophy. It ends with nutshell representations of the philosophies of Popper. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. The middle section of the book presents the connection between these philosophers and explains what their central ideas consists of, what the critical arguments are, how they presented them, and how valid they are. In the process, the author claims that Popper's popular critics used against him arguments that he had invented (and answered) without saying so. They differ from him mainly in that they demanded of all criticism that it should be constructive: do not stop believing a refuted theory unless there is a better alternative to it. Popper hardly ever discussed belief, delegating its study to psychology proper; he usually discussed only objective knowledge, knowledge that is public and thus open to public scrutiny.
650 0|aPhilosophy.
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 14|aPhilosophy.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Science.
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776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9783319065861
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9783319065885
830 0|aSpringerBriefs in Philosophy,|x2211-4556
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950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)