Scientific Realism [electronic resource] : A Critical Reappraisal / by N. Rescher.

Erişim Adresi
Link
ISBN
9789400939059
Dil Kodu
İngilizce
Yer Numarası
DK/10596
Yazar
Rescher, N.
Basım Bildirimi
1st ed. 1987.
Yayın Bilgisi
Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1987.
Fiziksel Niteleme
184 p. 1 illus. online resource.
Dizi
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science, and Related Fields, 2215-1974 ; 40
İçindekiler Notu
One / Problems of Scientific Realism -- 1. Scientific Realism -- 2. The Problematic Character of Scientific Realism: Current Science Does Not Do the Job -- 3. Future Science Does Not Do the Job -- Two / Scientific Progress as Nonconvergent -- 1. The Exploration Model and Its Implications -- 2. Theorizing as Inductive Projection -- 3. Scientific Revolutions as Potentially Unending -- 4. Is Later Lesser? -- Three / Ideal-Science Realism -- 1. Reality is Adequately Described Only by Ideal Science, Which is Something We Do Not Have -- 2. Scientific Truth as an Idealization -- 3. Ideal-State Realism as the Only Viable Option -- Four / Against Instrumentalism: Realism and the Task of Science -- 1. Against Instrumentalism: The Descriptive Purport of Science -- 2. Realism and the Aim of Science -- 3. The Pursuit of Truth -- 4. Anti-realism and “Rigorous Empiricism” -- 5. The Price of Abandoning Realism -- Five / Schoolbook Science as a Basis for Realism -- 1. The Security/Definiteness Trade-off and the Contrast between Science and Common Sense -- 2. Schoolbook Science and “Soft” Knowledge -- 3. Schoolbook Science as a Basis for Realism -- Six / Disconnecting their Applicative Success from the Truth of Scientific Theories -- 1. Is Successful Applicability an Index of Truth? -- 2. Truth is NOT the Best Explanation of Success in Prediction and Explanation -- 3. Pragmatic Ambiguity -- 4. The Lesson -- Seven / The Anthropomorphic Character of Human Science -- 1. Scientific Relativism -- 2. The Problem of Extraterrestrial Science -- 3. The Potential Diversity of “Science” -- 4. The One-World, One-Science Argument -- 5. The Anthropomorphic Character of Human Science -- 6. Relativistic Intimations -- Eight / Evolution’s Role in the Success of Science -- 1. The Problem of Mind/Reality Coordination -- 2. TheCognitive Accessibility of Nature -- 3. A Closer Look at the Problem -- 4. “Our” Side -- 5. Nature’s Side -- 6. Synthesis -- 7. Implications -- Nine / The Roots of Objectivity -- 1. The Cognitive Inexhaustibility of Things -- 2. The Cognitive Opacity of Real Things -- 3. The Corrigibility of Conceptions -- 4. Perspectives on Realism -- Ten / Metaphysical Realism and the Pragmatic Basis of Objectivity -- 1. The Existential Component of Realism -- 2. Realism in its Regulative/Pragmatic Aspect -- 3. Objectivity as a Requisite of Communication and Inquiry -- 4. The Utilitarian Imperative -- 5. Retrojustification: The Wisdom of Hindsight -- Eleven / Intimations of Idealism -- 1. The Idealistic Aspect of Metaphysical Realism -- 2. The Idealistic Aspect of Epistemological Realism -- 3. Conceptual Idealism -- 4. Is Man the Measure? -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.
Özet, vb.
The increasingly lively controversy over scientific realism has become one of the principal themes of recent philosophy. 1 In watching this controversy unfold in the rather technical way currently in vogue, it has seemed to me that it would be useful to view these contemporary disputes against the background of such older epistemological issues as fallibilism, scepticism, relativism, and the traditional realism/idealism debate. This, then, is the object of the present book, which will recon­ sider the newer concerns about scientific realism in the context of these older philosophical themes. Historically, realism concerns itself with the real existence of things that do not "meet the eye" - with suprasensible entities that lie beyond the reach of human perception. In medieval times, discussions about realism focused upon universals. Recognizing that there are physical objects such as cats and triangular objects and red tomatoes, the medievels debated whether such "abstract objects" as cathood and triangularity and redness also exist by way of having a reality indepen­ dent of the concretely real things that exhibit them. Three fundamen­ tally different positions were defended: (1) Nominalism. Abstracta have no independent existence as such: they only "exist" in and through the objects that exhibit them. Only particulars (individual substances) exist. Abstract "objects" are existents in name only, mere thought­ fictions by whose means we address concrete particular things. (2) Realism. Abstracta have an independent existence as such.
Konu
Science __ Philosophy.
Philosophy of Science.
Kurum Adı
SpringerLink (Online service)
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