Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance [electronic resource] / edited by Claude d'Aspremont, Victor A. Ginsburgh, Henri R. Sneessens, Frans Spinnewyn.
Erişim Adresi
ISBN
9781461507833
Dil Kodu
İngilizce
Yer Numarası
DK/10933
Basım Bildirimi
1st ed. 2002.
Yayın Bilgisi
New York, NY : Springer US : Imprint: Springer, 2002.
Fiziksel Niteleme
XI, 242 p. online resource.
İçindekiler Notu
1 The Effects of Welfare Benefits on the Duration of Welfare Spells -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Data -- 1.3 Nonparametric Analysis -- 1.4 Parametric Analysis of Welfare Spell Durations -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 The Design of Active Labour Market Policies -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Policy Effectiveness and the Underlying Causes of Unemployment Persistence -- 2.3 Incentives: Do they matter? -- 2.4 Conclusion -- 3 Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Job Matching, Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment -- 3.3 A Numerical Simulation for Belgium -- 3.4 Conclusion -- 4 Unemployment Compensation Preferences -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Preferences Concerning Unemployment Insurance: a Simple Model -- 4.3 Design of the Survey -- 4.4 Estimation Results: Preferences Concerning the Unemployment Insurance System -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Competition and Budget Devolution in Health Care -- 5.1 The 1990 Reforms -- 5.2 Evaluating the 1990 Reforms -- 5.3 The New Labour Government Tries Again -- 6 Pension Provision in the United States -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Public Sources of Income -- 6.3 Private Pension Plans -- 6.4 Sustainability of the Public System -- 6.5 Activity Rates -- 6.6 Income Distribution -- 6.7 Conclusions -- 7 The Willingness to Pay for Pensions -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Model -- 7.3 The Relationship Between Instantaneous Utilities and Lifetime Utilities -- 7.4 Benchmarks -- 7.5 Funded System with Income Insurance -- 7.6 Pay-as-you-go Pension Systems -- 7.7 Discussion -- 8 Social Security and Risk Sharing -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Model -- 8.3 Interim Optimality -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Intergenerational Transfers -- 8.5 Proofs -- 9 Transition from Unfunded to Funded Social Security -- 9.1 A Simple Model -- 9.2 Would the Young Ever Want to Bribe the Old? -- 9.3 How Should Pension Funds Be Managed? -- 9.4 Conclusion -- 10 Voting over Social Security with Uncertain Lifetimes -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Economy -- 10.3 Flat-Rate Benefits -- 10.4 Contribution-Related Benefits -- 10.5 Means-Tested Benefits -- 10.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4 -- 11 The Political Economy -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Model -- 11.3 Majority Voting in the Steady State -- 11.4 Demographic Shock -- 11.5 Choosing the Parameters ? and p -- 11.6 Conclusion.
Özet, vb.
Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance provides both an empirical and a theoretical account of the main difficulties presently threatening social insurance systems in most industrialized countries. It analyzes the remedies that have been discussed and sometimes introduced and addresses many questions still left largely unresolved: Are newly implemented or proposed reforms providing the correct incentives to all participants in the system? Is the quality of service improving and, if not, what can be done? How should the budgetary problems be solved considering both intra-generational and inter-generational redistributive policies? The volume describes a number of studies of social security systems in various countries and assesses the effect of various policies, including welfare or unemployment benefits, training and other active labour market policies, the provision of pension, and competition and budget devolution in health care. It applies empirical tests to individual preferences concerning unemployment compensation, and it analyzes nonfunded and funded social security systems, the transition from one system to the other, and the willingness to pay for pensions.
Konu
Social legislation.
Economics.
Social service.
Econometrics.
Microeconomics.
Finance.
Labour Law/Social Law.
Economics.
Social Work.
Quantitative Economics.
Microeconomics.
Financial Economics.
Economics.
Social service.
Econometrics.
Microeconomics.
Finance.
Labour Law/Social Law.
Economics.
Social Work.
Quantitative Economics.
Microeconomics.
Financial Economics.
Kurum Adı
Eseri Alıntıla
Referansları kullanmadan önce gözden geçirmeniz ve varsa gerekli düzeltmeleri yapmanız önerilir.
Dijital Kaynak
MARC Görünümü
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245 10|aInstitutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance|h[electronic resource] /|cedited by Claude d'Aspremont, Victor A. Ginsburgh, Henri R. Sneessens, Frans Spinnewyn.
250 |a1st ed. 2002.
264 1|aNew York, NY :|bSpringer US :|bImprint: Springer,|c2002.
300 |aXI, 242 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |a1 The Effects of Welfare Benefits on the Duration of Welfare Spells -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Data -- 1.3 Nonparametric Analysis -- 1.4 Parametric Analysis of Welfare Spell Durations -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 The Design of Active Labour Market Policies -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Policy Effectiveness and the Underlying Causes of Unemployment Persistence -- 2.3 Incentives: Do they matter? -- 2.4 Conclusion -- 3 Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Job Matching, Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment -- 3.3 A Numerical Simulation for Belgium -- 3.4 Conclusion -- 4 Unemployment Compensation Preferences -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Preferences Concerning Unemployment Insurance: a Simple Model -- 4.3 Design of the Survey -- 4.4 Estimation Results: Preferences Concerning the Unemployment Insurance System -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Competition and Budget Devolution in Health Care -- 5.1 The 1990 Reforms -- 5.2 Evaluating the 1990 Reforms -- 5.3 The New Labour Government Tries Again -- 6 Pension Provision in the United States -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Public Sources of Income -- 6.3 Private Pension Plans -- 6.4 Sustainability of the Public System -- 6.5 Activity Rates -- 6.6 Income Distribution -- 6.7 Conclusions -- 7 The Willingness to Pay for Pensions -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Model -- 7.3 The Relationship Between Instantaneous Utilities and Lifetime Utilities -- 7.4 Benchmarks -- 7.5 Funded System with Income Insurance -- 7.6 Pay-as-you-go Pension Systems -- 7.7 Discussion -- 8 Social Security and Risk Sharing -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Model -- 8.3 Interim Optimality -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Intergenerational Transfers -- 8.5 Proofs -- 9 Transition from Unfunded to Funded Social Security -- 9.1 A Simple Model -- 9.2 Would the Young Ever Want to Bribe the Old? -- 9.3 How Should Pension Funds Be Managed? -- 9.4 Conclusion -- 10 Voting over Social Security with Uncertain Lifetimes -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Economy -- 10.3 Flat-Rate Benefits -- 10.4 Contribution-Related Benefits -- 10.5 Means-Tested Benefits -- 10.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4 -- 11 The Political Economy -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Model -- 11.3 Majority Voting in the Steady State -- 11.4 Demographic Shock -- 11.5 Choosing the Parameters ? and p -- 11.6 Conclusion.
520 |aInstitutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance provides both an empirical and a theoretical account of the main difficulties presently threatening social insurance systems in most industrialized countries. It analyzes the remedies that have been discussed and sometimes introduced and addresses many questions still left largely unresolved: Are newly implemented or proposed reforms providing the correct incentives to all participants in the system? Is the quality of service improving and, if not, what can be done? How should the budgetary problems be solved considering both intra-generational and inter-generational redistributive policies? The volume describes a number of studies of social security systems in various countries and assesses the effect of various policies, including welfare or unemployment benefits, training and other active labour market policies, the provision of pension, and competition and budget devolution in health care. It applies empirical tests to individual preferences concerning unemployment compensation, and it analyzes nonfunded and funded social security systems, the transition from one system to the other, and the willingness to pay for pensions.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aSocial legislation.
650 0|aEconomics.
650 0|aSocial service.
650 0|aEconometrics.
650 0|aMicroeconomics.
650 0|aFinance.
650 14|aLabour Law/Social Law.
650 24|aEconomics.
650 24|aSocial Work.
650 24|aQuantitative Economics.
650 24|aMicroeconomics.
650 24|aFinancial Economics.
700 1 |ad'Aspremont, Claude.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aGinsburgh, Victor A.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aSneessens, Henri R.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aSpinnewyn, Frans.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9780792374176
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461507840
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461352372
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0783-3
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXLC
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aLaw and Criminology (R0) (SpringerNature-43727)
001 809644
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260131022708
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 121227s2002 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9781461507833|9978-1-4615-0783-3
024 7 |a10.1007/978-1-4615-0783-3|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aK1700-1973
072 7|aLNH|2bicssc
072 7|aLNT|2bicssc
072 7|aLAW054000|2bisacsh
072 7|aLNH|2thema
072 7|aLNT|2thema
082 04|a344.01|223
090 |aDK/10933
245 10|aInstitutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance|h[electronic resource] /|cedited by Claude d'Aspremont, Victor A. Ginsburgh, Henri R. Sneessens, Frans Spinnewyn.
250 |a1st ed. 2002.
264 1|aNew York, NY :|bSpringer US :|bImprint: Springer,|c2002.
300 |aXI, 242 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |a1 The Effects of Welfare Benefits on the Duration of Welfare Spells -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Data -- 1.3 Nonparametric Analysis -- 1.4 Parametric Analysis of Welfare Spell Durations -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 The Design of Active Labour Market Policies -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Policy Effectiveness and the Underlying Causes of Unemployment Persistence -- 2.3 Incentives: Do they matter? -- 2.4 Conclusion -- 3 Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Job Matching, Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment -- 3.3 A Numerical Simulation for Belgium -- 3.4 Conclusion -- 4 Unemployment Compensation Preferences -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Preferences Concerning Unemployment Insurance: a Simple Model -- 4.3 Design of the Survey -- 4.4 Estimation Results: Preferences Concerning the Unemployment Insurance System -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Competition and Budget Devolution in Health Care -- 5.1 The 1990 Reforms -- 5.2 Evaluating the 1990 Reforms -- 5.3 The New Labour Government Tries Again -- 6 Pension Provision in the United States -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Public Sources of Income -- 6.3 Private Pension Plans -- 6.4 Sustainability of the Public System -- 6.5 Activity Rates -- 6.6 Income Distribution -- 6.7 Conclusions -- 7 The Willingness to Pay for Pensions -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Model -- 7.3 The Relationship Between Instantaneous Utilities and Lifetime Utilities -- 7.4 Benchmarks -- 7.5 Funded System with Income Insurance -- 7.6 Pay-as-you-go Pension Systems -- 7.7 Discussion -- 8 Social Security and Risk Sharing -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Model -- 8.3 Interim Optimality -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Intergenerational Transfers -- 8.5 Proofs -- 9 Transition from Unfunded to Funded Social Security -- 9.1 A Simple Model -- 9.2 Would the Young Ever Want to Bribe the Old? -- 9.3 How Should Pension Funds Be Managed? -- 9.4 Conclusion -- 10 Voting over Social Security with Uncertain Lifetimes -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Economy -- 10.3 Flat-Rate Benefits -- 10.4 Contribution-Related Benefits -- 10.5 Means-Tested Benefits -- 10.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4 -- 11 The Political Economy -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Model -- 11.3 Majority Voting in the Steady State -- 11.4 Demographic Shock -- 11.5 Choosing the Parameters ? and p -- 11.6 Conclusion.
520 |aInstitutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance provides both an empirical and a theoretical account of the main difficulties presently threatening social insurance systems in most industrialized countries. It analyzes the remedies that have been discussed and sometimes introduced and addresses many questions still left largely unresolved: Are newly implemented or proposed reforms providing the correct incentives to all participants in the system? Is the quality of service improving and, if not, what can be done? How should the budgetary problems be solved considering both intra-generational and inter-generational redistributive policies? The volume describes a number of studies of social security systems in various countries and assesses the effect of various policies, including welfare or unemployment benefits, training and other active labour market policies, the provision of pension, and competition and budget devolution in health care. It applies empirical tests to individual preferences concerning unemployment compensation, and it analyzes nonfunded and funded social security systems, the transition from one system to the other, and the willingness to pay for pensions.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aSocial legislation.
650 0|aEconomics.
650 0|aSocial service.
650 0|aEconometrics.
650 0|aMicroeconomics.
650 0|aFinance.
650 14|aLabour Law/Social Law.
650 24|aEconomics.
650 24|aSocial Work.
650 24|aQuantitative Economics.
650 24|aMicroeconomics.
650 24|aFinancial Economics.
700 1 |ad'Aspremont, Claude.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aGinsburgh, Victor A.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aSneessens, Henri R.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aSpinnewyn, Frans.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9780792374176
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461507840
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781461352372
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0783-3
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXLC
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aLaw and Criminology (R0) (SpringerNature-43727)
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