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020 |a9789401025195|9978-94-010-2519-5
024 7 |a10.1007/978-94-010-2519-5|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aQ174-175.3
050 4|aB67
072 7|aPDA|2bicssc
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072 7|aPDA|2thema
082 04|a501|223
090 |aDK/11035
100 1 |aBunge, M.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aMethod, Model and Matter|h[electronic resource] /|cby M. Bunge.
250 |a1st ed. 1973.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1973.
300 |a204 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,|x2542-8292 ;|v44
505 0 |a1. Introduction: On Method in the Philosophy of Science -- I: Scientific Method -- 2. Testability Today -- 3. Is Biology Methodologically Unique? -- 4. The Axiomatic Method in Physics -- II: Conceptual Models -- 5. Concepts of Model -- 6. Analogy, Simulation, Representation -- 7. Mathematical Modeling in Social Science -- III: Metaphysics -- 8. Is Scientific Metaphysics Possible? -- 9. The Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Methodology of Levels -- 10. How do Realism, Materialism and Dialectics Fare in Contemporary Science? -- Name Index.
520 |aThis collection of essays deals with three clusters of problems in the philo­ sophy of science: scientific method, conceptual models, and ontological underpinnings. The disjointedness of topics is more apparent than real, since the whole book is concerned with the scientific knowledge of fact. Now, the aim of factual knowledge is the conceptual grasping of being, and this understanding is provided by theories of whatever there may be. If the theories are testable and specific, such as a theory of a particular chemical reaction, then they are often called 'theoretical models' and clas­ sed as scientific. If the theories are extremely general, like a theory of syn­ thesis and dissociation without any reference to a particular kind of stuff, then they may be called 'metaphysical' - as well as 'scientific' if they are consonant with science. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of kinds of factual theories. Thus the entire spectrum should be dominated by the scientific method, quite irrespective of the subject matter. This is the leitmotiv of the present book. The introductory chapter, on method in the philosophy of science, tackles the question 'Why don't scientists listen to their philosophers?'.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
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532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Science.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789027702524
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401025201
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401025218
830 0|aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,|x2542-8292 ;|v44
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2519-5
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950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)