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020 |a9789401707152|9978-94-017-0715-2
024 7 |a10.1007/978-94-017-0715-2|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aBD300-450
072 7|aHPJ|2bicssc
072 7|aPHI013000|2bisacsh
072 7|aQDTJ|2thema
082 04|a111|223
090 |aDK/11320
100 1 |aEllis, R.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 13|aAn Ontology of Consciousness|h[electronic resource] /|cby R. Ellis.
250 |a1st ed. 1986.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1986.
300 |aVIII, 205 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aMartinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ;|v18
505 0 |aI—Psychological Methods of Observing Consciousness -- II—The Relation between Consciousness and Physiology -- III—The Ego as Continuity of Conscious Functions -- IV—Conscious Structures -- V—The Directed Attention Progression.
520 |aThe object of this study is to find a coherent theoretical approach to three problems which appear to interrelate in complex ways: (1) What is the ontological status of consciousness? (2) How can there be 'un­ conscious,' 'prereflective' or 'self-alienated' consciousness? And (3) Is there a 'self' or 'ego' formed by means of the interrelation of more elementary states of consciousness? The motivation for combining such a diversity of difficult questions is that we often learn more by looking at interrelations of problems than we could by viewing them only in isola­ tion. The three questions posed here have emerged as especially prob­ lematic in the context of twentieth century philosophy. 1. The question of the ontological status of consciousness The question 'What is consciousness?' is one of the most perplexing in philosophy-so perplexing that many have been motivated to proceed as though consciousness did not exist. If William James was speaking rhetorically when he said "Consciousness does not exist," 1 many behaviorists of the recent past were not. 2 James meant only to imply that consciousness is not an independently existing soul-substance, along­ side physical substances. He did not mean that we do not really 'have' consciousness, and he did not provide final resolution for the problem of the causal interrelations between consciousness and the physical realm (e. g. , our bodies). Many recent philosophers and psychologists, however, try to proceed as though these problems did not exist.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
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650 0|aOntology.
650 0|aPhilosophy.
650 14|aOntology.
650 24|aPhilosophy.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789024733491
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048182985
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401707169
830 0|aMartinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ;|v18
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0715-2
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)