Explanation, Causation and Deduction [electronic resource] / by Fred Wilson.
Erişim Adresi
ISBN
9789400952492
Dil Kodu
İngilizce
Yer Numarası
DK/11496
Yazar
Basım Bildirimi
1st ed. 1985.
Yayın Bilgisi
Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1985.
Fiziksel Niteleme
400 p. online resource.
Dizi
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science, and Related Fields, 2215-1974 ; 26
İçindekiler Notu
1 / The Deductive Model of Explanation: A Statement -- 1.1. Explanation and Deduction -- 1.2. The Humean Account of Laws -- 1.3. The Evidential Worth of Law-Assertions -- 1.4. That Some Explanations Are Better than Others -- 1.5. That Technical Rules of Computation Are Laws -- 2 / The Reasonability of the Deductive Model -- 2.1. Why Ought the Deductive Model Be Accepted? -- 2.2. Are There Reasoned Predictions Which Are Not Explanations? -- 2.3. Is Correlation Less Explanatory than Causation? -- 2.4. Is Causation Inseparable from Action? -- 2.5. Are There Explanations Without Predictions? -- 2.6. Explanation and Judgment -- 3 / Explanations and Explanings -- 3.1. Explanations in the Context of Communication -- 3.2. Formalist Criticisms of the Deductive Model -- 3.3. Explanations and Explanatory Content -- 3.4. Narrative and Integrating Explanations -- 3.5. Are Laws Evidence for, or Part of, Explanations? -- 3.6. Can We Know Causes Without Knowing Laws? -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Notes to Chapter 1 -- Notes to Chapter 2 -- Notes to Chapter 3 -- Notes to Conclusion -- Name Index.
Özet, vb.
The purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as (1) the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as (2) the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction.
Konu
Science __ Philosophy.
Philosophy of Science.
Philosophy of Science.
Kurum Adı
Eseri Alıntıla
Referansları kullanmadan önce gözden geçirmeniz ve varsa gerekli düzeltmeleri yapmanız önerilir.
Dijital Kaynak
MARC Görünümü
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490 1 |aThe Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science, and Related Fields,|x2215-1974 ;|v26
505 0 |a1 / The Deductive Model of Explanation: A Statement -- 1.1. Explanation and Deduction -- 1.2. The Humean Account of Laws -- 1.3. The Evidential Worth of Law-Assertions -- 1.4. That Some Explanations Are Better than Others -- 1.5. That Technical Rules of Computation Are Laws -- 2 / The Reasonability of the Deductive Model -- 2.1. Why Ought the Deductive Model Be Accepted? -- 2.2. Are There Reasoned Predictions Which Are Not Explanations? -- 2.3. Is Correlation Less Explanatory than Causation? -- 2.4. Is Causation Inseparable from Action? -- 2.5. Are There Explanations Without Predictions? -- 2.6. Explanation and Judgment -- 3 / Explanations and Explanings -- 3.1. Explanations in the Context of Communication -- 3.2. Formalist Criticisms of the Deductive Model -- 3.3. Explanations and Explanatory Content -- 3.4. Narrative and Integrating Explanations -- 3.5. Are Laws Evidence for, or Part of, Explanations? -- 3.6. Can We Know Causes Without Knowing Laws? -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Notes to Chapter 1 -- Notes to Chapter 2 -- Notes to Chapter 3 -- Notes to Conclusion -- Name Index.
520 |aThe purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as (1) the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as (2) the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction.
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532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Science.
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776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789027718563
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007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 121227s1985 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9789400952492|9978-94-009-5249-2
024 7 |a10.1007/978-94-009-5249-2|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aQ174-175.3
050 4|aB67
072 7|aPDA|2bicssc
072 7|aSCI075000|2bisacsh
072 7|aPDA|2thema
082 04|a501|223
090 |aDK/11496
100 1 |aWilson, Fred.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aExplanation, Causation and Deduction|h[electronic resource] /|cby Fred Wilson.
250 |a1st ed. 1985.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1985.
300 |a400 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aThe Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science, and Related Fields,|x2215-1974 ;|v26
505 0 |a1 / The Deductive Model of Explanation: A Statement -- 1.1. Explanation and Deduction -- 1.2. The Humean Account of Laws -- 1.3. The Evidential Worth of Law-Assertions -- 1.4. That Some Explanations Are Better than Others -- 1.5. That Technical Rules of Computation Are Laws -- 2 / The Reasonability of the Deductive Model -- 2.1. Why Ought the Deductive Model Be Accepted? -- 2.2. Are There Reasoned Predictions Which Are Not Explanations? -- 2.3. Is Correlation Less Explanatory than Causation? -- 2.4. Is Causation Inseparable from Action? -- 2.5. Are There Explanations Without Predictions? -- 2.6. Explanation and Judgment -- 3 / Explanations and Explanings -- 3.1. Explanations in the Context of Communication -- 3.2. Formalist Criticisms of the Deductive Model -- 3.3. Explanations and Explanatory Content -- 3.4. Narrative and Integrating Explanations -- 3.5. Are Laws Evidence for, or Part of, Explanations? -- 3.6. Can We Know Causes Without Knowing Laws? -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Notes to Chapter 1 -- Notes to Chapter 2 -- Notes to Chapter 3 -- Notes to Conclusion -- Name Index.
520 |aThe purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as (1) the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as (2) the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Science.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789027718563
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789400952508
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401088183
830 0|aThe Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science, and Related Fields,|x2215-1974 ;|v26
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5249-2
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)
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