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020 |a9781402047138|9978-1-4020-4713-8
024 7 |a10.1007/1-4020-4713-4|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aQ174-175.3
050 4|aB67
072 7|aPDA|2bicssc
072 7|aSCI075000|2bisacsh
072 7|aPDA|2thema
082 04|a501|223
090 |aDK/12411
100 1 |aGinev, Dimitri.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 14|aThe Context of Constitution|h[electronic resource] :|bBeyond the Edge of Epistemological Justification /|cby Dimitri Ginev.
250 |a1st ed. 2006.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c2006.
300 |aX, 258 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v247
505 0 |aIdeas for the situatedtranscendence of scientific research -- Reformulating the concept of “normal science” in the framework of hermeneutic phenomenology -- Hermeneutic phenomenology of scientific research -- The normativity of normal science: hermeneutic contextualism and proto-normativity.
520 |aThis study brings together ideas developed over many years in various lectures in an endeavour to clarify the concept of hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research. The starting point of my investigations was the outline of an interp- tative approach to the constitution of science’s cognitive content. In the late 1970s I was preoccupied with a question that nowadays should be formulated as follows: Is it possible to claim a validity of the hermeneutic view of the “situatedness in a tradition” also for the natural sciences? I was convinced that the negative answer implies a self-defeating position. It states that in order to champion the (cultural) universality of hermeneutics, one has to profess the non-hermeneutic nature of the natural sciences. Paradoxically enough, this a- wer presupposes a sharp dividing line (between dialogical experience and monological research) in culture in order to stress the universality of hermeneutics. Long before the period of perestroika in my corner, I learned from Joseph Kockelmans, Patrick Heelan, and Theodore Kisiel how the universalization of hermeneutics can include the natural sciences without ignoring their cognitive specificity. Somewhat later, in the aftermath of the discussions over the “finalization of science”, I began to confront the view that it would be a kind of trivializing the struggle for a philosophical hermeneutics if the theory-observation nexus is treated as a specific hermeneutic circle. No doubt, the view is correct. I was, however, dissatisfied with the way of arguing for it.
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aSocial sciences.
650 0|aHumanities.
650 0|aScience|xHistory.
650 0|aPhenomenology .
650 14|aPhilosophy of Science.
650 24|aHumanities and Social Sciences.
650 24|aHistory of Science.
650 24|aPhenomenology.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781402047121
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048108299
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048171767
830 0|aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v247
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4713-4
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)