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020 |a9781402038389|9978-1-4020-3838-9
024 7 |a10.1007/978-1-4020-3838-9|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
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082 04|a501|223
100 1 |aDilworth, Craig.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 14|aThe Metaphysics of Science|h[electronic resource] :|bAn Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories /|cby Craig Dilworth.
250 |a2nd ed. 2007.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c2007.
300 |aXVI, 333 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v173
505 0 |aEmpiricism Vs. Realism – The Perennial Debate In The Philosophy Of Science -- Fundamental And Refined Principles: The Core Of Modern Science -- Empirical Laws: The Supervention Of Experience -- Scientific Theories: Closing The Circle -- The Principle-Theory-Law Model Of Scientific Explanation -- The Social Sciences: A Consideration Of Economics -- Natural Kinds -- Probability And Confirmation -- Empiricism Vs. Realism Revisited -- Modern Science And The Future.
520 |aThe roots of this work lie in my earlier book, Scientific Progress, which first appeared in 1981. One of its topics, the distinction - tween scientific laws and theories, is there treated with reference to the same distinction as drawn by N. R. Campbell in his Physics: The Elements. Shortly after completing Scientific Progress, I read Rom Harré’s The Principles of Scientific Thinking, in which the concept of theory is even more clearly delineated than in Campbell, being directly connected to the notion of a model – as it was in my book. In subsequent considerations regarding science, Harré’s work thus - came my main source of inspiration with regard to theories, while Campbell’s remained my main source with respect to empirical laws. Around the same time I also read William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In this work, Whewell depicts principles as playing a central role in the formation of science, and conceives of them in much the same way as Kant conceives of fundamental synthetic a priori judgements. The idea that science should have principles as a basic element immediately made sense to me, and from that time I have thought of science in terms of laws, theories and principles.
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aPhilosophy and social sciences.
650 0|aBiology|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aMetaphysics.
650 0|aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Science.
650 24|aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Biology.
650 24|aMetaphysics.
650 24|aEpistemology.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781402038372
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781402063275
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048104901
830 0|aBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science,|x2214-7942 ;|v173
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-3838-9
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950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)