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020 |a9789401030489|9978-94-010-3048-9
024 7 |a10.1007/978-94-010-3048-9|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aQ174-175.3
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072 7|aPDA|2bicssc
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082 04|a501|223
090 |aDK/13838
100 1 |aMichalos, Alex C.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 14|aThe Popper-Carnap Controversy|h[electronic resource] /|cby Alex C. Michalos.
250 |a1st ed. 1971.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1971.
300 |aXI, 124 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |aI: Introduction -- II: Acceptability and Logical Improbability -- III: Two Explicanda and Three Arguments -- IV: Bar-Hillel’s “Comments” and Unrestricted Universals -- V: Instance and Qualified-Instance Confirmation -- VI: The Singular Predictive Inference -- VII: Lakatos on Appraisal, Growth and Analytic Guides -- VIII: Hintikka and Hilpinen on Inductive Generalzation -- IX: Cost-Benefit Versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules -- List of Reference.
520 |a1 In 1954 Karl Popper published an article attempting to show that the identification of the quantitative concept degree of confirmation with the quantitative concept degree of probability is a serious error. The error was presumably committed by J. M. Keynes, H. Reichen­ bach and R. Carnap. 2 It was Popper's intention then, to expose the error and to introduce an explicatum for the prescientific concept of degree of confirmation. A few months later Y. Bar-Hillel published an article attempting to show that no serious error had been committed (particularly by Carnap) and that the problem introduced by Popper was simply a "verbal one. "3 Popper replied immediately that "Dr. Bar-Hillel forces me [Popper] now to criticize Carnap's theory further," and he [Popper] introduced further objections which, if accepted, destroy Carnap's theory. 4 About eight years after this exchange took place I was in graduate school at the University of Chicago in search of a topic for a doctoral dissertation. An investigation of the issues involved in this exchange seemed to be ideal for me because I had (and still have) a great ad­ miration for the work of both Carnap and Popper. A thoroughly revised and I hope improved account of that investigation appears in the first five chapters of this book. Put very briefly, what I found were four main points of contention.
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650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aPhilosophy.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Science.
650 24|aPhilosophy.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789024751273
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401030496
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3048-9
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950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)