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020 |a9789048132638|9978-90-481-3263-8
024 7 |a10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aQ174-175.3
050 4|aB67
072 7|aPDA|2bicssc
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245 10|aEPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science|h[electronic resource] :|bLaunch of the European Philosophy of Science Association /|cedited by Mauricio Suárez, Mauro Dorato, Miklós Rédei.
250 |a1st ed. 2010.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c2010.
300 |aX, 341 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |aNaturalism and the Scientific Status of the Social Sciences -- Reconsidering Gilbert’s Account of Social Norms -- Theories for Use: On the Bearing of Basic Science on Practical Problems -- Structural Realism as a Form of Humility -- Approaching the Truth via Belief Change in Propositional Languages -- Can Graphical Causal Inference Be Extended to Nonlinear Settings? -- Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation -- Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability -- Interpretation in the Natural Sciences -- Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity -- Why Should Philosophers of Science Pay Attention to the Commercialization of Academic Science? -- Some Consequences of the Pragmatist Approach to Representation -- The Gray Area for Incorruptible Scientific Research -- Epistemic Replacement Relativism Defended -- Models and Truth -- Theory Change, Truthlikeness, and Belief Revision -- Mechanisms: Are Activities up to the Job? -- Why the Model-Theoretic View of Theories Does Not Adequately Depict the Methodology of Theory Application -- A Deflationary, Neo-Mertonian Critique of Academic Patenting -- ‘I Want to Look Like a Lady, Not Like a Factory Worker’ Rose Rand, a Woman Philosopher of the Vienna Circle -- Natural Kind Theory as a Tool for Philosophers of Science -- Whence Ontological Structural Realism? -- Local, General and Universal Prediction Methods: A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Induction -- Multiple Contraction Revisited -- Statistical Inference Without Frequentist Justifications -- Carnap and the Perils of Ramseyfication -- Naturalizing Meaning Through Epistemology: Some Critical Notes -- What Games Do Scientists Play? Rationality and Objectivity in a Game-Theoretic Approach to the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge.
650 0|aScience|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0|aPhilosophy and social sciences.
650 0|aBiology|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aLogic.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Science.
650 24|aEpistemology.
650 24|aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Biology.
650 24|aLogic.
700 1 |aSuárez, Mauricio.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aDorato, Mauro.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
700 1 |aRédei, Miklós.|eeditor.|4edt|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048132621
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048132645
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789400791510
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)