LEADER 04044nam a22005175i 4500
001 813283
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260130230556
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 121227s1978 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9789401197625|9978-94-011-9762-5
024 7 |a10.1007/978-94-011-9762-5|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aD1-2027
072 7|aHB|2bicssc
072 7|aHBAH|2bicssc
072 7|aHIS000000|2bisacsh
072 7|aNH|2thema
072 7|aNHAH|2thema
082 04|a900|223
090 |aDK/14528
100 1 |aWilson, Charles.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aProfit and Power|h[electronic resource] :|bA Study of England and the Dutch Wars /|cby Charles Wilson.
250 |a1st ed. 1978.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1978.
300 |aXIV, 170 p. 4 illus.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |aI Profit and Power -- II Representative Thought and National Policy -- III Economic Relations and the Sources of Tension in the First Half of the Century -- IV War in Embryo -- V The First Dutch War -- VI Prudent Idealism: an Interlude (1654-60) -- VII Foreign Trade and Domestic Politics at the Restoration -- VIII The Colonial Prelude and the Approach of the Second Dutch War -- IX A War of Tradesmen -- X Conclusion -- A List of the Principal Sources Consulted.
520 |aHistorical explanations need to keep step with the march of research if they are not to degenerate into empty cliches. It has long been a commonplace of 17th century history that the Anglo-Dutch Wars were the product of 'commercial rivalry'. This essay, first published twenty years ago, attempted to analyse and redefine this overworked traditional concept so as to explain more precisely how it led to naval wars between the Dutch and the English. Two idees fixes of contemporary English thought seemed especially significant; one was the persistent consciousness of English inferiority and backwardness in economic affairs when compared with the Dutch; the other, compounding this, was the equally persistent conviction that strategically, England seemed well placed to wreck the Dutch maritime economy and bring the Republic to her knees in a naval war. These obsessive beliefs combined naturally with the specific influences and motives of powerful political and commercial lobbies to stoke the fires of aggression. Failing over several decades to make any visible progress by more or less peaceful policies, they turned, first, to economic warfare by means of propaganda and pseudo-legal claims to maritime sovereignty; finally (in 1652) to all-out eco nomic and naval warfare.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aHistory.
650 14|aHistory.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789024720835
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401197632
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9762-5
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXH
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aHistory (R0) (SpringerNature-43722)