Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching [electronic resource] / by R.A. Armstrong.
Erişim Adresi
ISBN
9789401193887
Dil Kodu
İngilizce
Yer Numarası
DK/15272
Yazar
Basım Bildirimi
1st ed. 1966.
Yayın Bilgisi
Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1966.
Fiziksel Niteleme
XVIII, 195 p. online resource.
İçindekiler Notu
I. The Nature of the Problems and Some Previously Suggested Solutions -- I. An outline of the problems to be considered -- II. An outline of some contemporary writers -- III. A statement of the problems to be solved, and the procedure to be followed -- II. An Examination of the Concept of “Self Evidence” in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching -- I. The nature of the problem, some preliminary considerations, and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. S. Thomas’s teaching concerning the concept of “self evidence” in natural law precepts -- III. The role of the Thomistic concept naturalis inclinatio in our knowledge of self-evident natural law precepts -- IV. A critical assessment of some of the precepts suggested by contemporary writers as being self-evident, together with a summary of the main findings of this chapter -- III. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle -- I. Recapitulation -- II. The problem of the character of precepts which are not self-evident -- III. The problem in the Commentary on the Sentences -- IV. The Problem in the Summa Contra Gentiles -- V. The problem in the Commentary on the Ethics -- IV. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Summa Theologica -- The History of the text -- Method of presentation to be followed -- V. Some Comments on the Validity and Usefulness of the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Precepts -- I. A statement of the aims of this chapter and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. Our assessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on the possibility of “logical extension” in natural law -- III. A finalassessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on primary and secondary precepts, and their division -- IV. The validity and value of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts -- VI. The Concept of Variability Among the Secondary Precepts of Natural Law -- I. A discussion on the aims of this chapter and the procedure to be followed -- II. Mere historical changes in positive moral beliefs -- III. Historical changes correlated with the rational development of man -- IV. Changes in natural law due to the intrinsic complexity of certain particular situations -- V. The variability of decisions in particular situations due to the contingency of principles -- VI. Variability in natural law due to the “non-obligatory” character of positively formulated precepts -- VII. Variability in natural law due to changes in the intrinsic structure of society -- Conclusion -- Index of Authors.
Özet, vb.
Never before in the history of mankind has there been a period when hitherto accepted moral principles have been more severely tested. The agonized cry of a world smitten by two major wars in a handful of years leaves no doubt in the minds of many that natural law ethics, ifit is to have relevance and to survive, must provide at least the outline of an answer to the problems of every day living. To date, many hundreds of books and articles have been written setting forth with great eloquence the basic and immutable principles of natural law ethics. But too often these discussions fail to consider, in their agonizing detail, situations where there is a choice between conflicting values, conflicting loyalties, conflicting ideas and duties, each of which has a claim to recognition. It is only in the isolation of the particular case that the frightening dilemmas of natural law can be most clearly experienced. To give just two illustrations.
Konu
Religion __ Philosophy.
Philosophy of Religion.
Philosophy of Religion.
Kurum Adı
Eseri Alıntıla
Referansları kullanmadan önce gözden geçirmeniz ve varsa gerekli düzeltmeleri yapmanız önerilir.
Dijital Kaynak
MARC Görünümü
LEADER 05947nam a22004935i 4500
001 814033
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260130222003
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 121227s1966 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9789401193887|9978-94-011-9388-7
024 7 |a10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aBL51
072 7|aHRAB|2bicssc
072 7|aPHI022000|2bisacsh
072 7|aQRAB|2thema
082 04|a210|223
090 |aDK/15272
100 1 |aArmstrong, R.A.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aPrimary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching|h[electronic resource] /|cby R.A. Armstrong.
250 |a1st ed. 1966.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1966.
300 |aXVIII, 195 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |aI. The Nature of the Problems and Some Previously Suggested Solutions -- I. An outline of the problems to be considered -- II. An outline of some contemporary writers -- III. A statement of the problems to be solved, and the procedure to be followed -- II. An Examination of the Concept of “Self Evidence” in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching -- I. The nature of the problem, some preliminary considerations, and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. S. Thomas’s teaching concerning the concept of “self evidence” in natural law precepts -- III. The role of the Thomistic concept naturalis inclinatio in our knowledge of self-evident natural law precepts -- IV. A critical assessment of some of the precepts suggested by contemporary writers as being self-evident, together with a summary of the main findings of this chapter -- III. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle -- I. Recapitulation -- II. The problem of the character of precepts which are not self-evident -- III. The problem in the Commentary on the Sentences -- IV. The Problem in the Summa Contra Gentiles -- V. The problem in the Commentary on the Ethics -- IV. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Summa Theologica -- The History of the text -- Method of presentation to be followed -- V. Some Comments on the Validity and Usefulness of the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Precepts -- I. A statement of the aims of this chapter and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. Our assessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on the possibility of “logical extension” in natural law -- III. A finalassessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on primary and secondary precepts, and their division -- IV. The validity and value of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts -- VI. The Concept of Variability Among the Secondary Precepts of Natural Law -- I. A discussion on the aims of this chapter and the procedure to be followed -- II. Mere historical changes in positive moral beliefs -- III. Historical changes correlated with the rational development of man -- IV. Changes in natural law due to the intrinsic complexity of certain particular situations -- V. The variability of decisions in particular situations due to the contingency of principles -- VI. Variability in natural law due to the “non-obligatory” character of positively formulated precepts -- VII. Variability in natural law due to changes in the intrinsic structure of society -- Conclusion -- Index of Authors.
520 |aNever before in the history of mankind has there been a period when hitherto accepted moral principles have been more severely tested. The agonized cry of a world smitten by two major wars in a handful of years leaves no doubt in the minds of many that natural law ethics, ifit is to have relevance and to survive, must provide at least the outline of an answer to the problems of every day living. To date, many hundreds of books and articles have been written setting forth with great eloquence the basic and immutable principles of natural law ethics. But too often these discussions fail to consider, in their agonizing detail, situations where there is a choice between conflicting values, conflicting loyalties, conflicting ideas and duties, each of which has a claim to recognition. It is only in the isolation of the particular case that the frightening dilemmas of natural law can be most clearly experienced. To give just two illustrations.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aReligion|xPhilosophy.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Religion.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401186131
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401193894
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)
001 814033
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260130222003
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 121227s1966 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9789401193887|9978-94-011-9388-7
024 7 |a10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aBL51
072 7|aHRAB|2bicssc
072 7|aPHI022000|2bisacsh
072 7|aQRAB|2thema
082 04|a210|223
090 |aDK/15272
100 1 |aArmstrong, R.A.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aPrimary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching|h[electronic resource] /|cby R.A. Armstrong.
250 |a1st ed. 1966.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c1966.
300 |aXVIII, 195 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |aI. The Nature of the Problems and Some Previously Suggested Solutions -- I. An outline of the problems to be considered -- II. An outline of some contemporary writers -- III. A statement of the problems to be solved, and the procedure to be followed -- II. An Examination of the Concept of “Self Evidence” in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching -- I. The nature of the problem, some preliminary considerations, and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. S. Thomas’s teaching concerning the concept of “self evidence” in natural law precepts -- III. The role of the Thomistic concept naturalis inclinatio in our knowledge of self-evident natural law precepts -- IV. A critical assessment of some of the precepts suggested by contemporary writers as being self-evident, together with a summary of the main findings of this chapter -- III. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle -- I. Recapitulation -- II. The problem of the character of precepts which are not self-evident -- III. The problem in the Commentary on the Sentences -- IV. The Problem in the Summa Contra Gentiles -- V. The problem in the Commentary on the Ethics -- IV. The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Summa Theologica -- The History of the text -- Method of presentation to be followed -- V. Some Comments on the Validity and Usefulness of the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Precepts -- I. A statement of the aims of this chapter and an outline of the procedure to be followed -- II. Our assessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on the possibility of “logical extension” in natural law -- III. A finalassessment of S. Thomas’s teaching on primary and secondary precepts, and their division -- IV. The validity and value of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts -- VI. The Concept of Variability Among the Secondary Precepts of Natural Law -- I. A discussion on the aims of this chapter and the procedure to be followed -- II. Mere historical changes in positive moral beliefs -- III. Historical changes correlated with the rational development of man -- IV. Changes in natural law due to the intrinsic complexity of certain particular situations -- V. The variability of decisions in particular situations due to the contingency of principles -- VI. Variability in natural law due to the “non-obligatory” character of positively formulated precepts -- VII. Variability in natural law due to changes in the intrinsic structure of society -- Conclusion -- Index of Authors.
520 |aNever before in the history of mankind has there been a period when hitherto accepted moral principles have been more severely tested. The agonized cry of a world smitten by two major wars in a handful of years leaves no doubt in the minds of many that natural law ethics, ifit is to have relevance and to survive, must provide at least the outline of an answer to the problems of every day living. To date, many hundreds of books and articles have been written setting forth with great eloquence the basic and immutable principles of natural law ethics. But too often these discussions fail to consider, in their agonizing detail, situations where there is a choice between conflicting values, conflicting loyalties, conflicting ideas and duties, each of which has a claim to recognition. It is only in the isolation of the particular case that the frightening dilemmas of natural law can be most clearly experienced. To give just two illustrations.
532 8 |aAccessibility summary: This PDF is not accessible. It is based on scanned pages and does not support features such as screen reader compatibility or described non-text content (images, graphs etc). However, it likely supports searchable and selectable text based on OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Users with accessibility needs may not be able to use this content effectively. Please contact us at accessibilitysupport@springernature.com if you require assistance or an alternative format.
532 8 |aInaccessible, or known limited accessibility
532 8 |aNo reading system accessibility options actively disabled
532 8 |aPublisher contact for further accessibility information: accessibilitysupport@springernature.com
650 0|aReligion|xPhilosophy.
650 14|aPhilosophy of Religion.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401186131
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789401193894
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
912 |aZDB-2-BAE
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)
Materyaller
Depodan talep edilen materyal sadece kütüphane içerisinde kullanılmaktadır.
Materyal dışarıya ödünç verilmemektedir.
Materyal dışarıya ödünç verilmemektedir.
