LEADER 04112nam a22005895i 4500
001 814570
003 TR_AnAIT
005 20260130215000
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2009 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9781402087981|9978-1-4020-8798-1
024 7 |a10.1007/978-1-4020-8798-1|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aB829.5.A-Z
072 7|aHPCF3|2bicssc
072 7|aPHI018000|2bisacsh
072 7|aQDHR5|2thema
082 04|a142.7|223
090 |aDK/15808
100 1 |aHart, J.G.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aWho One Is|h[electronic resource] :|bBook 1: Meontology of the "I": A Transcendental Phenomenology /|cby J.G. Hart.
250 |a1st ed. 2009.
264 1|aDordrecht :|bSpringer Netherlands :|bImprint: Springer,|c2009.
300 |aXVI, 566 p.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 |aPhaenomenologica, Series Founded by H. L. Van Breda and Published Under the Auspices of the Husserl-Archives,|x2215-0331 ;|v189
505 0 |aPhenomenological Preliminaries -- The First Person and the Transcendental I -- Ipseity's Ownness and Uniqueness -- Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective -- Ontology and Meontology of I-ness -- The Paradoxes of the Transcendental Person -- The Death of the Transcendental Person -- The Afterlife and the Transcendental I.
520 |aBoth volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties. Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the "transcendental person." For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on "the afterlife." This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion.
650 0|aPhenomenology .
650 0|aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0|aReligion|xPhilosophy.
650 0|aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0|aMetaphysics.
650 0|aOntology.
650 14|aPhenomenology.
650 24|aEpistemology.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Religion.
650 24|aPhilosophy of Mind.
650 24|aMetaphysics.
650 24|aOntology.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9781402087974
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048121540
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9789048179909
830 0|aPhaenomenologica, Series Founded by H. L. Van Breda and Published Under the Auspices of the Husserl-Archives,|x2215-0331 ;|v189
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8798-1
912 |aZDB-2-SHU
912 |aZDB-2-SXPR
950 |aHumanities, Social Sciences and Law (SpringerNature-11648)
950 |aPhilosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)