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008 200701s2020 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a9783030490942|9978-3-030-49094-2
024 7 |a10.1007/978-3-030-49094-2|2doi
041 |aeng
049 |aTürk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi
050 4|aJF1525.P6
072 7|aJPP|2bicssc
072 7|aPOL028000|2bisacsh
072 7|aJPP|2thema
082 04|a320.6|223
090 |aDK/17307
100 1 |aYildirim, Aydin Baris.|eauthor.|4aut|4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 10|aValue Chains and WTO Disputes|h[electronic resource] :|bCompliance at the dispute settlement mechanism /|cby Aydin Baris Yildirim.
250 |a1st ed. 2020.
264 1|aCham :|bSpringer International Publishing :|bImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,|c2020.
300 |aXIII, 163 p. 12 illus., 6 illus. in color.|bonline resource.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 |atext file|bPDF|2rda
505 0 |a1.Introduction -- 2. Theorizing cooperation in international trade and the WTO DSM -- 3. Explaining patterns of WTO member behavior at the WTO dispute settlement -- 4. Firms, coalitions, and WTO disputes: Domestic private actors in the WTO -- 5. Conclusions.
520 |aAs economic populism and protectionism increasingly threatens the global trade order, this book examines the behavior of World Trade Organization (WTO) members at the judicial arm of the WTO—the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). The author explores why and when governments cooperate at the WTO and comply with the ruling of its panels, focusing on how the growth of global value chains through the internationalization of trade and production has increased the importance of both trade liberalization and supra-national governance and policy-making. Finding that domestic organized interests—i.e. firms and sectors—mobilize and lobby national governments to change their domestic policies to better harmonize with their international trade commitments, the author outlines how the time it takes to comply with adverse WTO rulings is shorter when the potential domestic costs of non-compliance outweigh protectionist interests. The author’s innovative research design highlights the conditions under which the WTO can preserve the rules of international trade and support a more open, global economy. Aydin Baris Yildirim is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the World Trade Institute, Bern, Switzerland.
650 0|aPolitical planning.
650 0|aInternational economic relations.
650 0|aInternational law.
650 0|aTrade regulation.
650 14|aPublic Policy.
650 24|aInternational Political Economy’.
650 24|aInternational Economic Law, Trade Law.
710 2 |aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9783030490935
776 08|iPrinted edition:|z9783030490959
856 40|uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49094-2
912 |aZDB-2-POS
912 |aZDB-2-SXPI
950 |aPolitical Science and International Studies (SpringerNature-41174)
950 |aPolitical Science and International Studies (R0) (SpringerNature-43724)